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CO. AND THE SCOPE OF DISPARATE
IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA
NICHOLAS PIACENTE†
INTRODUCTION
The specter of discrimination continues to plague the job
search process for millions of Americans.1 Whether in the form of
overt discrimination, or vague criteria such as “fit,” the hiring
practices of many firms still impose barriers to entry for discrete
groups and deprive individuals of the opportunity to work in
certain industries.2 In response to these barriers, Congress
passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the cornerstone
of federal employment discrimination law in the United States.3
Since the enactment of Title VII, the endeavor to eradicate
discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin” has transformed the way in which business is
conducted, staff is managed, and job applicants are hired in
America.4
†
Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review, 2017; J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. John’s
University School of Law; A.B., 2013, Princeton University. The Author would like to
extend his gratitude to Professor Patricia Montana for her guidance and to the staff
of the St. John’s Law Review, and to his family for their support.
1
See KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, DOCUMENTING
DESEGREGATION: RACIAL AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN PRIVATE-SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 155 (2012); Dorian T. Warren, Racial
Inequality in Employment in Postracial America, in BEYOND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN A POSTRACIST ERA 135, 135 (Frederick C. Harris & Robert C.
Lieberman, eds., 2013).
2
See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Claims of Age Bias Rise, But Standards of Proof are
High, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/yourmoney/trying-to-make-a-case-for-age-discrimination.html.
3
See Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)).
4
See id.; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975)
(noting that Congress intended for the protections of Title VII and the ADEA to
function as a “spur or catalyst” compelling employers “to self-examine and to self-
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Recognizing the unique hurdles faced by older people in the
workforce, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”) of 1967.5 The ADEA is viewed as a
companion statute to Title VII, and in fact, derives much of its
language and structure from that earlier law.6 In enacting the
ADEA, the Ninetieth Congress took inspiration from the Wirtz
Report,7 which noted that “employers for a variety of reasons
seek young workers” to the disadvantage of more experienced
individuals.8 Echoing these sentiments, the preamble to the
ADEA conveys that its central purpose is “to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment.”9 The ADEA is also intended
“to promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age,” and “to help employers and workers find ways
of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.”10
The ADEA has only become more relevant now that the
American workforce is aging.11 More than half of Americans
working today are over the age of forty.12 Likewise, the number
of workers over the age of fifty-five continues to rise relative to
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible,
the last vestiges” of discrimination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)).
6
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (announcing “[i]n fact, the
prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII”). The phrase, in
haec verba, means “in these words,” and it refers to the use of texts verbatim in
other texts.
7
See W. Willard Wirtz, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age
Discrimination in Employment, Report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress Under
Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1965), as reprinted in EEOC, Legislative
History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Acts (1981).
8
See id.
9
29 U.S.C § 621(b) (2012).
10
Id.
11
See Mitra Toossi & Elka Torpey, Older Workers: Labor Force Trends and
Career Options, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (May 2017),
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2017/article/older-workers.htm; see also Kenneth
R. Davis, Age Discrimination and Disparate Impact: A New Look at an Age-Old
Problem, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 361 (2004/2005) (“As the generation of baby
boomers approaches its fifties and sixties, it occupies every venue in the American
workforce.”).
12
See Employment Status of the Civilian, Noninstitutional Population by Age,
Sex, and Race, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/c
ps/cpsaat03.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2018) (expressing the percentages of all
employed people over forty years old, which when combined yields 54.5% of the total
employed population).
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younger age brackets.13 The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects
that by 2024, the labor participation rate for people between the
ages of fifty-five and sixty-four will grow by 2.2%, while the same
rate for individuals aged sixty-five and older will grow by 3.1%.14
Thus, the centrality of the ADEA in employment law has only
increased since its enactment in the mid-1960s.
While great strides have been made in combatting age
discrimination since then, individuals over the age of forty still
face patent and latent discrimination in the American labor
market.15 This struggle has been particularly acute in the job
search and interview process. Recently, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.,16 found that job applicants may bring disparate
impact claims under the ADEA, making it the first federal
appeallate court to recognize these claims for job seekers under
the Act.17 However, after granting a rehearing en banc, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed itself, in an 8-to-3 decision, holding
that job applicants may not assert disparate impact claims under
the ADEA.18 The plaintiff in Villarreal, a forty-nine-year-old

13
See Ann Marie Tracey, Still Crazy After All These Years? The ADEA, the
Roberts Court, and Reclaiming Age Discrimination as Differential Treatment, 46 AM.
BUS. L.J. 607, 607 (2009).
14
Civilian Labor Participation Rate by Age, Gender, Race and Ethnicity, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_303.htm
(last modified Jan. 19, 2018).
15
See Ashton Applewhite, You're How Old? We'll Be in Touch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/opinion/sunday/youre-how-old-well-bein-touch.html (recounting a story about a man who overheard a prospective
employer call him “too old” for an available position).
16
Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal II), 806 F.3d 1288 (11th
Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800
(11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017).
17
Id. at 1302–03.
18
See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal III), 839 F.3d 958, 963
(11th Cir. 2016). A claim for disparate treatment requires a demonstration of
discriminatory intent, whereas disparate impact concerns practices which are
ostensibly neutral on their face, but substantially impact a certain protected
segment of society. The Supreme Court has articulated the distinctions:
Disparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
“disparate impact.” The latter involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
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man, applied for a regional sales manager position with R.J.
Reynolds, but his application was repeatedly denied despite his
years of sales experience.19 The Supreme Court in Smith v. City
of Jackson first announced that disparate impact protections are
cognizable under the ADEA,20 but the ruling only addressed
current employees, not job applicants.21
This Note argues that § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA permits
disparate impact claims for job applicants, despite the revised
holding of the Eleventh Circuit. First, the plain meaning of
§ 4(a)(2) strongly suggests that disparate impact protections lie
for job seekers, in contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s ultimate
finding. This argument draws on a close textual and structural
analysis of the ADEA, supplemented with a comparative analysis
to Title VII.22
Furthermore, this Note unpacks the legal
arguments surrounding the 1972 amendment to Title VII,
demonstrating that the absence of the “applicants for
employment” language from § 4(a)(2) does not restrict the scope
of disparate impact theory to current employees under the
ADEA. This reflects the robust case law to suggest otherwise, as
well as the practical limitations of the congressional override

more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
19
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1291. Mr. Villarreal brought an action for age
discrimination pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 623, the disparate impact provision of the
ADEA. This section of the ADEA provides, “It shall be unlawful for an
employer . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because such individual's age.”
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
20
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
21
See id. at 240. Previously, the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth circuits have denied
job applicants the right to assert disparate impact claims under the ADEA, but these
rulings date from the early to mid-1990s. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99
F.3d 1466, 1470 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007
n.12 (10th Cir. 1996); E.E.O.C. v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077–78
(7th Cir. 1994). However, Smith overruled both Ellis and Francis W. Parker School,
rendering this circuit split less fractious.
22
By comparison, Title VII recognizes disparate impact protections for both job
applicants and current employees. The difference, in part, derives from a key textual
difference between the two statutes. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to provide
an express provision for job applicants—“his employees or applicants for
employment . . . ,” while Congress has not revisited the ADEA to insert the same
language to § 4(a)(2). See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012)).
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amendment as a legislative device, which evidences very little if
any congressional intent to distinguish between closely related
statutes.
I. VILLARREAL V. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.: FACTUAL
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AND THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Richard M. Villarreal applied for a Territory Manager
position with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (“RJR”) on
November 8, 2007.23 At the time, he was forty-nine years old.24
The Territory Manager job was a sales position, and Villarreal
had more than eight years of sales experience when he applied.25
Almost three years later, Villarreal applied for the Territory
Manager position again, in June 2010.26
Unlike in 2007,
Villarreal received prompt notification from RJR that his
application had been rejected.27 He applied for the same position
in December 2010, May 2011, September 2011, and March
2012.28 None of Villarreal’s applications led to a job interview, or
any other further employment action.29
Between 2007 and 2012, RJR contracted with two recruiting
companies, Kelly Services, Inc. and Pinstripe, to review
applications and forward résumés to its human resources office.30
To assist Kelly Services in selecting résumés, RJR provided it
with specific guidelines of “what to look for on a resume,”
“targeted candidate” qualities, and characteristics to “stay away
from.”31 Among the desired attributes were “2-3 years out of
college” and “adjusts easily to changes.”32 Among the disfavored
qualities was “8-10 years” of sales experience.33 RJR also
23

Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal I), No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS,
2013 WL 823055, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2013), rev'd and remanded, 806 F.3d 1288
(11th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL
635800 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at *2.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at *1.
32
Id.
33
Id. at *1.
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provided Pinstripe with certain criteria, largely based on the
attributes of recent hires who had earned the status of “Blue
Chip Territory Manager.”34 Of the new hires who had attained
the Blue Chip accolade, only nine percent had six or more years
of sales experience.35
Between September 2007 and March 2008, Kelly Services
received 19,086 applications for Territory Manager position, with
9,100 originating from applicants with eight or more years of
sales experience.36 Kelly Services only submitted fifteen percent
of the latter group’s applications to RJR for further review,
compared to thirty-five percent of those applications with less
professional experience.37 Similar return rates occurred when
Pinstripe screened a total of 25,729 applications, of which 12,727
originated from candidates with more than ten years of
experience.38 Yet, Pinstripe referred just 7.7% of this subset to
RJR, compared to forty-five percent of applicants with less than
three years of experience.39 In total, RJR hired 1,024 individuals
for the Territory Manger position between September 2007 and
July 2010; and just nineteen were over the age of forty, or 1.9%.40
Villarreal brought an action for discrimination under the
ADEA on behalf of “all applicants for the Territory manager
position who applied for the position since the date RJR began its
pattern or practice of discriminating against applicants over the
age of 40.”41 He asserted claims for both intentional age
discrimination,
or
disparate
treatment
under
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), and the unlawful use of hiring standards
34
Id. at *2. RJR management nominated a number of recent hires as “ideal”
Blue Chip sales force employees. Id. Statistically speaking, sixty-seven percent of
the Blue Chip employees had between zero and three years of work experience.
Among this group, just nine percent had six or more years of relevant experience. Id.
Their characteristics formed the criteria which Pinstripe used to filter applicants. Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at *2.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *3. Mr. Villarreal filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 17, 2010. Id. He did not file
with the EEOC until 2010 because he was awaiting a response to his 2007
application. Id. The EEOC issued a Right to Sue letter on April 2, 2012. Id. These
facts are relevant to the equitable tolling claim Mr. Villarreal asserted alongside his
disparate impact claim. This Note does not address this aspect of the Villarreal
litigation.
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that discriminated against individuals over the age of forty, or
disparate impact under 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).42
Specifically,
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, the disparate impact provision, provides,
“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because such
individual’s age.”43
In response, the District Court granted RJR’s motion to
dismiss.44 On substantive grounds, the District Court concluded
that under the ADEA, only current employees can bring
disparate impact claims, pursuant to Smith v. City of Jackson.45
Until then, the Supreme Court had only recognized disparate
impact claims for current employees or rehires, not job
applicants.46
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s
holding that only current employees can bring disparate impact
claims under the ADEA, finding instead that § 4(a)(2) of the
ADEA supports disparate impact protections for job applicants.47
Overall, Judge Martin’s opinion consisted of a three-part
inquiry, addressing various substantive arguments asserted by
Villarreal.
In the first part, Judge Martin evaluated the
language of the statute and the competing interpretations offered
by the litigants.48 RJR insisted that § 4(a)(2) only pertains to
current employees, given the clause, “to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees.”49 However, Mr. Villarreal argued that
the object of the verbs limit, segregate, and classify is “any
individual,” so the presence of “his employees” earlier in the

42

See id.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
44
See Villarreal I, 2013 WL 823055, at *8. As an initial matter, the court denied
Villarreal's claims originating before November 2009, dismissing them as timebarred. Id. at *7–8. The EEOC mandates that claimants file their complaints within
180 days of receiving a Right to Sue letter. Villarreal's claims dating back to
November 2007 clearly fell outside this window of time. Id. at *2.
45
See id. at *5.
46
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 230–31 (2005); E.E.O.C. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2008).
47
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1290, 1301. Prior to filing his appeal, Villarreal
also moved to amend his complaint, to include additional details to justify his delay
and persuade the court to grant his request for equitable tolling. Id. at 1292.
48
See id. at 1292–93.
49
See id. at 1293 (emphasis added).
43
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provision pertains to an employer’s selection of “any individuals”
to be “his employees.”50 Judge Martin determined that § 4(a)(2)
is reasonably susceptible to both interpretations, and a plain
reading was inconclusive.51
The second part of the opinion analyzed the relationship
between § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA and § 2000e-2(a)(2) of Title VII,
the provision on which § 4(a)(2) is based.52 As an initial matter,
the Court acknowledged that the language of the two statutes is
identical, with the exception of four words.53 In 1972, Congress
amended § 2000e-2(a)(2) to include the phrase “or applicants for
employment.”54 To date, Congress has not inserted “applicants
for employment” into § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.55 Despite this
difference, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider this absence to
be dispositive, sidestepping the holding in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services.56 Judge Martin opined that “[w]e will not
assume that Congress chose not to pass legislation modifying the
ADEA simply because it did make this one change in a broader
restructuring of Title VII.”57 This stance departed from that of
the District Court, which compared the twin provisions of the
ADEA and Title VII.58 Precisely because § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA
lacks the language “or applicants for employment,” the District

50

See id.
Id.
52
See id. at 1295.
53
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). In particular, Title VII language of
§ 703(a)(2) provides, “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id.
(emphasis added).
54
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1295.
55
Id.
56
See id. at 1295–96; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167
(2009). The District Court had in fact relied on Gross, and its seminal line, “[w]hen
Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have
acted intentionally.” Id. at 174. See discussion infra notes 135–160 and
accompanying text.
57
Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1296. Judge Martin also attended to the legislative
history and purpose of the ADEA to determine whether disparate impact claims
extend to job applicants. She acknowledged that Congress enacted the ADEA in
order to “promote employment of older persons”—29 U.S.C. § 621(b)—and to assist
peoples over the age of forty in their efforts “to regain employment when displaced
from jobs”—29 U.S.C. § 621(a). But the Eleventh Circuit declined to infer from these
statements that a cause of action may lie for job applicants under § 4(a)(2).
58
See Villarreal I, 2013 WL 823055, at *5–6.
51
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Court denied the claim that the ADEA supports disparate impact
claims for job applicants.59 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit held
that disparate impact claims could be available under the ADEA
despite the textual disparity with Title VII.60
Following the portions on statutory interpretation and
legislative history, the third and final part of the Eleventh
Circuit’s opinion addressed agency deference, and whether such
an analysis could resolve the dispute over disparate impact
claims for job applicants under the ADEA.61 First, Judge Martin
noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) stipulates in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) that “[a]ny
employment practice that adversely affects individuals within
the protected age group on the basis of older age is
discriminatory unless the practice is justified by a ‘reasonable
factor other than age.’ ”62
For the Eleventh Circuit, this
represented the official agency interpretation of § 4(a)(2).63 In
fact, the EEOC filed an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Villarreal
endorsing this reading of § 1625.7(c).64 Relying on the Chevron
deference standard, the court concluded that disparate impact
claims extend to job applicants under § 4(a)(2).65
By contrast, in his dissent, Judge Vinson maintained that
the absence of the “applicants for employment” language from
the ADEA indicated that disparate impact claims only pertain to
current employees.66

59

See id.
Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1293–95.
61
See id. at 1299. The Eleventh Circuit was quite explicit in disclosing its
methodology: “Because the text of § 4(a)(2) does not clearly resolve the issue in this
case, we ask the question we must when faced with a vague statute: has the agency
tasked with enforcing the statute given a reasonable reading?” Id. at 1298.
62
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1299 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (2017)).
63
Id. at 1299–1300.
64
Id. at 1303. RJR resisted this finding by arguing that 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c)
only pertained to the reasonable factor other than age defense (“RFOA”), discussed
extensively in Smith, and in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. In Smith,
four justices concluded that the RFOA defense, itself, suggests that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the ADEA. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228,
246 (2005).
65
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1299.
66
See id. at 1308–09 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
60
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On February 10, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit granted a
rehearing en banc, thus vacating the judgment.67 On October 5,
2016, an en banc panel overruled the initial Eleventh Circuit
holding, finding 8-to-3 that disparate impact protections are
restricted to current employees under the ADEA.68 Judge Pryor
While concurring in the
authored the majority opinion.69
judgment, Judge Jordan filed an opinion presenting his own
interpretation of § 4(a)(2), as did Judge Rosenbaum.70 Judge
Martin filed a dissent, which Judges Jordan and Rosenbaum
joined with respect to the equitable tolling issue, but not the
disparate impact claim.71
Judge Pryor adopted a plain reading of the statute to
conclude that the ADEA does not authorize disparate impact
claims for job applicants.72 The grammatical construction of
§ 4(a)(2) proved essential to this finding, specifically the final
clause, “or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee.”73 Under Judge Pryor’s approach, the preceding
portions of § 4(a)(2) are subordinate to this residual, functionally
supreme phrase, such that the individual asserting a claim under
§ 4(a)(2) must already be an employee to enjoy its protections.74
Judge Pryor also distinguished Griggs v. Duke Power Co. by
noting that Griggs concerned “promotion and transfer policies,”
not the “ ‘hiring criteria’ for fist-time applicants.”75 His opinion
declined to compare § 4(a)(2) to the analogous provision of Title
VII, § 703(a)(2), because “we do not consider legislative history
when the text is clear.”76
Judge Jordan filed a concurrence, objecting to Judge Pryor’s
reductive interpretation rendering the § 4(a)(2) functionally
dormant except for the final clause, “or otherwise adversely affect

67
See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800,
at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2016).
68
Villarreal III, 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016).
69
Id. at 962–73.
70
Id. at 973–75 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
975–81 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71
Id. at 981–93 (Martin, J., dissenting).
72
See id. at 963–64 (majority opinion).
73
See id.
74
See id.
75
Id. at 968–69. See also infra notes 189–198 and accompanying text for further
detail on Griggs.
76
Villareal III, 839 F.3d at 969.

FINAL_PIACENTE

2017]

6/16/2018 11:51 AM

NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE DESIRED

1015

his status as an employee.”77 Rather, Judge Jordan focused on
the key phrase “any individual,” noting the tension between “any
individual” and “employee” or “employees” elsewhere in
§ 4(a)(2).78 Preferring to read the provision as a functional whole,
Judge Jordan found that job seekers could bring disparate impact
claims, but only if the alleged discriminatory practice also
affected current employees at the same time.79
At the same time, Judge Rosenbaum concurred with Judge
Pryor’s interpretation, and elaborated even further on the
importance of the word “otherwise” as the operative term of
§ 4(a)(2).80 Furthermore, he engaged in a Whole Act Rule
analysis, observing those places within the ADEA where the
phrase “applicant for employment” appears, such as in § 4(a)(3),
to highlight its absence from § 4(a)(2).81 Judge Rosenbaum did
acknowledge the 1972, post-Griggs amendment to Title VII.82
Still, he argued that the Griggs ruling, announced before the
“applicants for employment” language was added to Title VII,
was unavailing because the 1972 amendment had languished in
Congress from 1967 until its formal enactment in 1972.83
Dissimilarly, Judge Martin, in her dissent, offered
alternative bases for finding disparate impact protections for job
seekers under the ADEA.84 Notably, Judge Martin began with a
discussion of the Griggs decision, observing that “[t]he text of the
ADEA that we interpret here is identical to the text the Supreme
Court interpreted in Griggs.”85 Martin raised other salient

77

See id. at 973–74 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 974.
79
See id. (“If we are trying to give effect to both critical terms—'his employees'
and 'any individual'—the reading that makes the most sense to me is that a job
applicant ('any individual') can bring an ADEA claim under a disparate impact
theory, but only if something the employer has done vis-à-vis 'his employees' violates
the ADEA by 'limit[ing], segregat[ing] or classify[ing]' those employees. So, if any
employer's practice with respect to his employees violates the ADEA, and that same
practice has a disparate impact on job applicants, those applicants can sue under
§ 623(a)(2).”).
80
See id. at 975–77 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81
Id. at 977–78.
82
See id. at 979–80.
83
See id. at 979.
84
See id. at 981–93 (Martin, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 981.
78
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points, such as the key term of “any individual,” and the original
draft bill for the ADEA, which substituted this term for the
originally much narrower, “his employees.”86
Absent from the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion was any
discussion of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., which had
been previously addressed in the District Court and first
Eleventh Circuit opinions.87 In fact, there was no mention of
Gross whatsoever throughout the Eleventh Circuit’s revisited
ruling.
II. PARSING THE STATUTE: THE CURRENT TEXT OF THE ADEA
AND DISPARATE IMPACT PROTECTIONS FOR JOB APPLICANTS
A.

Roadmap to the Legal Arguments

Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, the text of § 4(a)(2)
itself authorizes disparate impact protections for job applicants.
In the following two Parts, this Note offer two justifications for
this finding. First, the plain meaning of § 4(a)(2) enables
disparate impact protections for job seekers. Second, the case
law and legislative history of the ADEA confirms this
interpretation, independent of the plain meaning of the statute.
This precedential record supports the contention that disparate
impact protections lie for applicants.
This Part examines the language, grammar, and syntax of
§ 4(a)(2) to conclude that its text suggests that job applicants, as
well as current employees, may enjoy disparate impact
protections. Once again, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) reads:
It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s age.88

Overall, in the next Section, this Note demonstrates that § 4(a)(2)
is sensitive to the myriad forms of employment discrimination
based on age. Operating from this assumption, it illustrates that
the text of § 4(a)(2) is deliberately expansionist, because the
86
Id. at 981–82. The following is a keen rebuke: “The majority never explains
why Congress chose the term 'any individual' in § 4(a)(2) if it really meant
'employee.’ ” Id. at 984.
87
See generally Villarreal III, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016).
88
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
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provision speaks of “any” action that “deprive[s]” and merely
practices that “tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities.”89 Therefore, the ADEA enables job seekers to
bring disparate impact claims, along with current employees.
B.

Plain Meaning of Section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA

First, the use of the word “any” in § 4(a)(2), which appears
twice in the provision, strongly recommends that disparate
impact claims lie for job applicants. Here, Congress used the
word “any” to modify the modes of discrimination prohibited by
the law—“any way”—as well as the grammatical objects of
discrimination—“any individual.” On the face of the statute, the
placement and operation of the word “any” fails to impose
restrictions on the application of the statute, namely to current
employees alone. In addition, the word “individual” is modified
by the prepositional phrase of “of employment opportunities.”
Read altogether, the statute ostensibly refers to “any individual”
“deprive[d]” of “employment opportunities” in “any way.” Based
on this simple reading alone, the statute seems to apply to “any
individual,” not just current employees.
As well, the syntax of the simplified phrase, “to
limit . . . employees,” indicates that job seekers may assert
disparate impact protections.
The prohibition of “to
limit . . . employees” refers to discriminatory practices that have
the effect of excluding individuals from employment on the basis
of age. Read in this way, the statute plainly prohibits actions
that “limit . . . employees . . . because of such individual’s age.”
The use of “limit” in conjunction with “his employees,” strongly
suggests that the provision contemplates practices that
disparately impact older job seekers. The relationship between
the verb “limit” and the object “his employees,” focuses on
potential actions that bar individuals from employment
opportunities on the basis of age.90 This central concern is echoed
later in the key phrasing of “employment opportunities
or . . . status as an employee.” Accordingly, the operative syntax

89

See id.
To be sure, the next two verbs, segregate and classify, refer to acts that
pertain to both current employees, as well as applicants. Nevertheless, the
simplified phrase of “limit . . . his employees” clearly contemplates the employee
selection process—that is, job applicants.
90
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of § 4(a)(2) repeatedly prohibits actions that restrict employment
opportunities, implying that job applicants are covered by the
ADEA’s conception of disparate impact.
Moreover, Congress notably selected the expansive “any
individual,” instead of specifying “any employee” at the end of the
clause, “which would deprive or tend to deprive.” An early draft
of § 4(a)(2) restricts the object of the operative verbs to
“employees.” The provision was originally constructed as “limit,
segregate, or classify employees so as to deprive them of
employment opportunities or adversely affect their status.”91 But
in its current form, the statute eschews this far narrower
language, with employees as the direct object, in favor of “any
individual.”
Furthermore,
Congress
eliminated
the
demonstrative pronouns of “them” and “their” referring back to
“employees” found in its initial draft.92 Clearly, the drafters
preferred the language “any individual,” a deliberately broad
approach. Likewise, Congress could have employed language
like “such employees,” recalling the direct object of “his
employees.”93 Instead, the statute refers to “any individual,” a
telling choice. Thus, whatever the meaning of “any individual,” it
must mean something more than just current employees.
In addition to the words “any individual,” other aspects of
§ 4(a)(2) also recommend an expansive understanding of the
statute’s scope. The provision begins with the broadly worded,
“limit, segregate, or classify.” It does not just condemn acts that
“segregate,” but also those that may simply “limit or classify”
individuals on the basis of age. Furthermore, the various clauses
of § 4(a)(2) logically function in unison, such that the “limit,
segregate, or classify” phrase distributes across the whole of the
provision. Under this reading, the later phrase “deprive any
individual of employment opportunities” operates reflectively,
91
See Villareal II, 806 F.3d 1288, 1298 n.8 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in
original), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 635800
(11th Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct.
2292 (2017).
92
See id.
93
En Banc Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at
10, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 1510602), 2016 WL 1376063, at *10. Oddly, RJR submitted this evidence, arguing that
§ 4(a)(2) is principally concerned with current employees. However, the choice of
Congress to abandon this language, in favor of more expansive language, suggests
the opposite: § 4(a)(2) at the very least encompasses some group besides current
employees, whether or not it be job applicants, or perhaps past employees.
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prohibiting employers from instituting practices that “limit,
segregate, or classify” employees “which would deprive any
individual . . . of employment opportunities.”
Crucially, this
reading adopts a global as opposed to a segmented interpretation
of the statute.
Along with this theme, the absence of any explicit mention of
job applicants in § 4(a)(2) is immaterial, because the tenor of the
statute is broad and inclusive. In fact, the absence permits its
protections to apply even more broadly than if job seekers were
explicitly mentioned. Enumerating job applicants would exclude
other classes of peoples by operation of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.94
For example, contractors or temporary
employees may not qualify as a protected class if the statute were
to itemize job applicants and current employees.95 This lack of
exclusive specificity in § 4(a)(2) authorizes the maximalist
purpose of the provision to reach a wide class of potential
litigants.
The penultimate clause of § 4(a)(2) affirms the maximalist
reading intrinsic to the language of § 4(a)(2). The clause reads,
“or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.” This
language significantly enlarges the scope of activities prohibited
by § 4(a)(2) as a whole, by extending to literally any acts that
“otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.” As the
statute is currently structured, this clause functions as a
protective, precautionary backstop. In cases where the “deprive
or tend to deprive any individual” clause has not been triggered,
the “or otherwise adversely affects his status as an employee”
clause ensures that § 4(a)(2) embraces practices that may not
overtly deprive individuals of employment, but still operate as
effective barriers. Overall, this penultimate provision betrays
the expansive and, arguably, overly inclusive tone of § 4(a)(2).
Similarly, a comparison between the § 4(a)(2) and § 4(a)(3) of
the ADEA reinforces this interpretation. Addressing retaliatory
actions, § 4(a)(3) makes it unlawful “to reduce the wage rate of

94

See All. for Cmty. Media v. F.C.C., 529 F.3d 763, 779 (6th Cir. 2008).
See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1943) (limiting
the application of ejusdem generis and expressio unius in the context of the 1933 Act
on the basis “that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
dominating general purpose . . . and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of
the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
expressed legislative policy”).
95

FINAL_PIACENTE

1020

6/16/2018 11:51 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1005

any employee in order to comply with this chapter.”96 In
§ 4(a)(3), “any” applies unambiguously to “employee,” in contrast
to § 4(a)(2), which provides protections for “any individual,” carte
blanche. The difference between these neighboring provisions is
glaring. It can be inferred from this distinction that if Congress
intended to restrict the object of “limit, segregate, or classify” to
only current employees, then it would have—and could have—
done so, by substituting “any individual” for “any employee.”
Despite this interpretation, the parties in Villarreal disputed
whether “any individual” is the object of the verbs “limit,
segregate, or classify,” or that the only object of these verbs is
“his employees.”97 Robert Villarreal asserted that the verbs
“limit, segregate, or classify” apply across the statute to “any
individual,” even though “his employees” is the direct object of
the three verbs.98 By contrast, RJR contended that the only
object of the three verbs is “his employees,” and that “any
individual” only refers to these employees—for example, “any
individual” is modified by “his employees,” even though the terms
are separated by eleven intervening words.
But once again, the relationship between the verb “limit” and
the object “his employees” overcomes this counterargument.
Whether or not “any individual” serves as the object of “limit,
segregate, or classify,” the core of the statute forbids actions that
“limit[, segregate, or classify] his employees in any way . . . .”
While this Note argues that “limit, segregate, or classify” applies
across the whole statute, even without so concluding, the statute
still addresses activities that “limit” employees on the basis of
age discrimination. Without question, then, hiring activities that
have the effect of limiting employees necessarily encompasses job
applicants for the statute to make logical sense, textually
speaking.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF DISJUNCTIVE CANONS:
THE 1972 AMENDMENTS TO TITLE VII AND ADEA CASE LAW
The previous Part presented a textual analysis of § 4(a)(2)
confirming that the unambiguous language of the ADEA permits
disparate impact claims for job applicants. While the plain

96
97
98

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (2012).
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1293.
See id.
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meaning of § 4(a)(2) supports this conclusion, the case law
interpreting the ADEA, and by extension, Title VII, affirms this
reading as well. The bulk of this case law concerns the role of the
1972 amendment to Title VII. With this amendment, Congress
added the language, “or applicants for employment,” to the
analogous provision of § 4(a)(2)—§ 703(a)(2) of Title VII. To date,
the ADEA has not been amended to conform with this revision to
Title VII.
The absence of the “applicants for employment” language
from the ADEA has been read to bar job seekers from claiming
disparate impact protections under the statute.99 This inference
reflects a comparison to Title VII, with its explicit enumeration of
applicants. The comparative analysis suggests that if Congress
intended for the ADEA to encompass job seekers under § 4(a)(2),
then Congress would have inserted the phrase, “or applicants for
employment,” as it did to Title VII in 1972.100 RJR advanced this
exact claim in Villarreal.101
While this language and its appearance in Title VII is
significant its absence from the ADEA, in truth, is unavailing.
This meaningful variation argument necessarily fails once one
observes the substantive case law surrounding Title VII and the
ADEA, as well as the legislative history of statutory amendments
which has resulted in the textual distinction.102 First, since the
inception of the federal employment discrimination laws, courts
have interpreted the statutes in tandem, due to their shared text
and shared purpose.103 This practice flows from the heavy
presumption of interpretive commonality when the language and
structure of one statute closely tracks the language and structure
of another.104 Over the last fifty years, the relationship between
Title VII and the ADEA, therefore, has been a symbiotic one of
uniform interpretation.105 Jurists have sought to align these two
99
See Villarreal I, No. 2:12-CV-0138-RWS, 2013 WL 823055, at *5 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 6, 2013); Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1308–09 (Vinson, J., dissenting); Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
100
See Villarreal I, 2013 WL 823055, at *5–6.
101
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d at 1296–97.
102
See infra notes 109–205 and accompanying text.
103
See infra Part III.A.
104
See infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text; see also Martin J. Katz,
Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 871 (2010) (“[T]he Gross Court rejected a
perfectly reasonable and widely applied canon of construction—the presumption of
uniformity—with no good reason for doing so.”).
105
See infra Part III.A.
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statutes rather than to differentiate them, with interpretation of
the ADEA paralleling and informing that of Title VII, and viceversa.106 Thus, § 4(a)(2) authorizes disparate impact claims for
applicants, in spite of the 1972 amendment to Title VII.
Second, the nature of congressional amendments to Title VII
and the ADEA does not overcome this interpretive practice,
despite the inconsistent legislative history of the two statutes. In
particular, the process by which Congress enacts override
amendments provides virtually no evidence for an intent to
distinguish two closely related statutes if one text is amended,
and the other is not.107 Therefore, the textual variation between
the two statutes is not interpretively meaningful, and so the
judicial practice of interpreting Title VII and the ADEA in pari
passu and in pari matera should control in the context of
§ 703(a)(2) and § 4(a)(2).
A final reason for recognizing disparate impact claims for job
seekers relates to the specific disposition of case law surrounding
§ 4(a)(2).
Assuming arguendo that the 1972 congressional
amendment to Title VII restricts disparate impact claims under
the ADEA, the Supreme Court determined that disparate impact
protections lie for job applicants under Title VII prior to the 1972
amendment.108 Accordingly, the 1972 addition of “applicants for
employment” to Title VII cannot serve as the legal basis for
restricting disparate impact claims under the ADEA to only
current employees. This finding demonstrates that disparate
impact claims extend to job applicants, under both statutes,
historically and currently, and is bolstered by the judicial
practice of maintaining interpretive unity between Title VII and
the ADEA.

106
107
108

See infra notes 123–134 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 152–205 and accompanying text.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
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The Canon of Uniformity for Title VII and the ADEA

The ADEA, passed by Congress in 1967, took inspiration
from Title VII, passed in 1964.109 The ADEA, itself, is closely
modeled after Title VII.110 The ADEA owes its basic structure to
Title VII, and derives the vast majority of its language, verbatim,
from Title VII.111
The close relationship between the two statutes has guided
and informed judicial interpretation of the ADEA for decades.112
Due to this shared textual DNA, the legal protections recognized
under the ADEA closely mirror those available under Title VII.113
Two examples are the disparate treatment cause of action and
the disparate impact cause of action.114 In fact, the disparate
treatment and disparate impact provisions within the ADEA are
based entirely on the disparate treatment and disparate impact
protections of Title VII.115

109
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975) (noting that
Congress intended for the protections of Title VII and the ADEA “to eliminate, so far
as possible, the last vestiges” of discrimination [in employment opportunities]).
110
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (“In fact, the prohibitions of
the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.”).
111
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 333 (2005) (“[W]e begin with the
premise that when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar
purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate
to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both
statutes.”); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
112
See Katz, supra note 104, at 872. Katz contends that the Court attempted to
unify the interpretive scheme for closely related statutes immediately preceding
Gross. He proffers the example of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
incorporating the employment benefit standard under Title VII into the ADEA, as
well as Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., in which the Court aligned union regulations
under Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), given the same
provisions in Title VII were derived in haec verba from the NLRA. See Goodman v.
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 688 (1987); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
113
See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 228.
114
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 29 USC § 623(a)(1), (2) (2012).
115
See Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 121 (1985) (finding employment
benefits under the ADEA should mirror those under Title VII given the textual
parity between the analogous provisions); Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City
Schs., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (finding that “a strong indication that
the two statutes should be interpreted pari passu” when the language of one statute
parallels that of another); see also Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–34 (“We have consistently
applied that presumption to language in the ADEA that was ‘derived in haec verba
from Title VII.’ ”) (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584).
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At the same time, the language of § 703(a)(2) and § 4(a)(2) is
identical, except that Title VII states, “it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment . . . .”116 The
remainder of the statute corresponds exactly to the language of
the ADEA, excluding the final clause of “because of such
individual’s age.”117 The only difference involves the “applicants
for employment” clause of Title VII.
In spite of this distinction, a long-established canon of
construction requires courts to interpret closely related statutes
with an eye towards conformity.118 Settled opinion recommends
that “statutes which relate to the same subject matter,” that is,
are in pari materia, “should be read, construed and applied
together so that the legislature’s intention can be gathered from
the whole of the enactments.”119 Leading authorities on statutory
This
interpretation advocate this interpretive scheme.120
approach respects the reality that statutes like Title VII and the
ADEA share a common purpose, and so the use of similar, if not
identical language suggests that the interpretation of these
statutes align.121 Within the legislative context of derivative
statutes, such as Title VII and the ADEA, the “canon of

116

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
118
See Lorrillard, 434 U.S. at 584; Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428.
119
In pari materia, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); Jamie Darin
Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 234
(2007) (“When the legislature borrows language from one statute to draft a
subsequent statute, courts generally agree that the statutes should be construed
consistently.”); Caren Sencer, When a Boss Isn't an Employer: Limitations of Title
VII Coverage, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 441, 466 (2004) (“Analysis of Title VII,
the ADA, and ADEA is very closely integrated, as Title VII and [the] ADEA use the
same definitions in most instances and many of those terms are explicitly
incorporated into the ADA.”).
120
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 282–85 (2000); William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27–
31 (1994).
121
See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995)
(commenting that the ADEA and Title VII exhibit common substantive aspects, and
serve common purposes); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233–34
(2005) (“We have consistently applied that presumption to language in the ADEA
that was 'derived in haec verba from Title VII.' ”) (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at
584).
117
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uniformity” ensures that language employed in one context—for
example, racial discrimination—conveys the same meaning in
other contexts—for example, age discrimination.122
Along these lines, the record of the ADEA and Title VII
jurisprudence has been one of equity and commonality, with
courts interpreting the statutes in like fashion.123 The 2005
ruling in Smith continued this legacy, recognizing for the first
time disparate impact protections under the ADEA, which had
first been established under Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.124 Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion began by outlining the
affinities between Title VII and the ADEA, owing to the textual
parity between the two statutes.125
Justice Stevens even
commented that “[e]xcept for the substitution of the word ‘age’ for
the words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the
language of [§ 4(a)(2)] in the ADEA is identical to that found in
§ 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).”126 The
opinion ventured as far as saying:
In determining whether the ADEA authorizes disparate-impact
claims, we begin with the premise that when Congress uses the
same language in two statutes having [a] similar purpose[],
particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is
appropriate to presume that Congress intended th[e] text to
have the same meaning in both statutes.127

While Justice Scalia’s concurrence, advocating for deference to
the EEOC interpretation of § 4(a)(2), carried the 5-to-3 ruling,
the principles articulated in Justice Steven’s opinion served as
the raison d’être for the Court’s conclusions.128

122
See Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428 (finding that “a strong indication that the
two statutes should be interpreted pari passu” when the language of one statute
parallels that of another).
123
See Katz supra note 104, at 860–63.
124
See Smith, 544 U.S. at 233.
125
See id. Especially telling is the following pronouncement: “Griggs, which
interpreted the identical text at issue here, thus strongly suggests that a disparateimpact theory should be cognizable under the ADEA.” Id. at 236.
126
See id. at 233.
127
See id.
128
See id. at 243–47 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist took no
part in the judgment, thus the 5-to-3 ruling.
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Likewise, the outcome under the ADEA in Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory paralleled the ruling in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,129 both addressing the burdens of
proof for disparate impact claims under the sister statutes.130 In
Meacham, the Court attempted to harmonize the causation
standard of the ADEA with the burden-shifting framework of
Title VII.131 At the time, Title VII required that an employer
demonstrate that an alleged discriminatory practice was a “bona
fide occupational qualification [“BFOQ”] reasonably necessary to
the normal operation” of a business.132 However, the ADEA
contains an explicit “reasonable factor other than age” (“RFOA”)
provision, whereby the employer may assert an RFOA defense to
exculpate itself.133 Still, in spite of the procedural distinction
between the BFOQ and RFOA, the Court held that the RFOA
provision is an affirmative defense, just as the BFOQ is an
affirmative defense under Title VII.134 In other words, the Court
aligned the burdens of proof under both statutes in Meacham,
despite the incidental distinctions between the functionally
analogous BFOQ and the RFOA provisions.
B.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and the Current Status
of Override Amendments

As shown in the rulings of Smith and Meacham, the Court
continued to abide by this practice of interpreting the ADEA in
pari materia with Title VII until recently.135 The Court departed
from this course with its controversial ruling in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.136 The outcome in Gross drove an
unprecedented wedge between Title VII and the ADEA, once
again with respect to the burden-shifting framework of the two

129
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
130
See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91; Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
131
See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 93. The Court sought to resolve the issue
persisting since Smith regarding the “reasonable factor other than age” (“RFOA”)
defense under the ADEA. Id. at 89–90.
132
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012). This standard is commonly referred to as
the “business necessity test.”
133
See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 92–93; see also id. at 87.
134
See id. at 93–95.
135
See Katz, supra note 104, at 858.
136
557 U.S. 167, 169–70, 180 (2009).
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statutes.137 Much like the arguments in Villarreal, the dispute in
Gross centered on a textual disparity between Title VII and the
ADEA owing to a congressional amendment of Title VII.138 To
summarize, the majority in Gross inferred a congressional intent
to distinguish the burdens of proof under the ADEA and Title VII
based on Congress’s failure to amend the ADEA in tandem with
Title VII.139
In Gross, a fifty-four-year-old employee was reassigned from
his managerial position to a “project coordinator” position, while
his former responsibilities were reassigned to a younger
colleague whom he had previously supervised.140 At trial, a
dispute arose as to the jury instructions.141 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the
instructions were incorrectly administered, based on the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.142 Price
Waterhouse, itself, outlined the burden-shifting framework for
disparate treatment claims under Title VII.143
But, the Court in Gross repudiated the approach of both the
trial court and the Eighth Circuit, basing its decision on the
absence of language in the ADEA, which Congress had
subsequently added to Title VII.144
The textual disparity
stemmed from the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments (“1991 CRA”),

137

See id. at 174–75.
See id. at 185–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the 1991 Act amended
only Title VII and not the ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court
reasonably declines to apply the amended provisions to the ADEA.”).
139
See id. at 174 (majority opinion) (“Congress neglected to add such a provision
to the ADEA when it amended Title VII to add §§ 2000e–2(M) and 2000e–5(g)(2)(B),
even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways . . . .”).
140
See id. at 170.
141
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008). At the
trial court level, the jury was instructed if Gross proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that his age was a motivating factor for his demotion, then Gross should
prevail, but if FBL Financial Services could then demonstrate that it would have
reached the same result, absent his age, then the jury must find in FBL's favor. See
id.
142
490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
143
See id. at 248–250, 254. The Court in Price Waterhouse grappled with
defining causation for Title VII disparate treatment claims, and more precisely,
whether or not direct evidence of discrimination is required to shift the burden to
the defendant in mixed-motive cases. Id. at 254. Justice O'Connor's decisive
concurrence recommended the direct evidence requirement. Id. at 267–69 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
144
See Gross, 577 U.S. at 172, 174–75.
138
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which represented Congress’s response to the Price Waterhouse
ruling.145
In this override amendment, Congress expressly
rejected the direct evidence requirement for motivating factor
discrimination, originally advocated in Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence.146 In addition to rejecting this aspect of the ruling,
the 1991 CRA amended and clarified other aspects of Title VII in
response to the parts of the Court’s decision with which it
disagreed.147
During this process, Congress also included
provisions amending the ADEA, but these revisions were
unrelated to Price Waterhouse and the Title VII burden-shifting
framework.148
This congressional record proved dispositive for the Court in
Gross, as Justice Thomas determined that neither the 1991 CRA
provisions, nor the ruling in Price Waterhouse controlled in the
context of the ADEA and the requisite burden of proof.149 Rather,
the Court found that under the ADEA, “but-for” causation is the
necessary burden, not the motivating factor standard
promulgated by the 1991 CRA.150 To arrive at this conclusion,
the Gross Court disposed of the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
framework for the ADEA on the basis that “Title VII is
materially different [from the ADEA] with respect to the relevant
burden of persuasion.”151 Prior to Gross, lower courts had already
applied the Price Waterhouse framework to the ADEA since

145
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
146
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 267–69.
147
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) In addition to Price
Waterhouse, the 1991 CRA sought to redress the ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
148
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1079
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2012)); id. § 302, at 1088 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006)). These two amendments to the ADEA made it
necessary for the EEOC to notify plaintiffs about the status of complaints filed with
the agency, so that plaintiffs could commence a civil action within the statutorilyrequired, ninety days. Id.
149
See Gross, 577 U.S. at 178, 180.
150
See id. at 177–78, 180.
151
See id. at 173. Justice Thomas also justified his repudiation of the Price
Waterhouse framework by contending “it is far from clear that the Court would have
the same approach were it to consider the question today in the first instance.” Id. at
178–79. In other words, he doubted that the Court would have derived the same
framework in 2009 as it had in 1989 under the Price Waterhouse plurality.
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1991.152 While the 1991 CRA undoubtedly controlled Title VII,
the prevailing logic assumed that the burden-shifting provisions
of Price Waterhouse persisted as to the ADEA and ADA.153
The Court in Gross vitiated this practice of interpretive
commonality, and the opinion attempted to delimit the scope of
the 1991 Civil Rights Amendments across the employment
discrimination statutes.154 Working from the assumption that
Congress neglected to amend the ADEA when it could have done
so in 1991, the Court inferred a congressional intent not to
amend the ADEA as it had Title VII with the 1991 CRA.155 The
Court articulated this tenet in the following passage:
We cannot ignore Congress’ [sic] decision to amend Title VII’s
relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.
When Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute
and different language in another, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally.156

It is clear, then, that the textual disparity engendered by the
1991 CRA served as the lynchpin for the Court in Gross. The
inconsistent amendments to the ADEA and Title VII signaled to
the Court that Congress intended to distinguish the burdens of
proof under the two statutes.157 This novel insight thereby
licensed Justice Thomas to synthesize a causation framework for
the ADEA completely divorced from Title VII and Title VII case
law.158
The opinion in Gross forever changed the landscape of Title
VII and its legislative progeny, namely the ADEA. At the very
least, the holding in Gross stands for the proposition that if
Congress does not amend closely related statutes, in an identical
fashion, then the amendment of the one statute is wholly

152
See Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance
of Congress's Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157, 160 (2012).
153
See id. at 159–60.
154
Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2012) [hereinafter
Widiss, The Hydra Problem].
155
See Gross, 577 U.S. at 174–75.
156
See id. at 174–75 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
256 (1991)).
157
See id.
158
See id. at 179–80; see also Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 511, 561 (2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents].
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irrelevant to the other.159
More overtly, Gross infers a
congressional intent for closely related statutes to evolve along
different tracks when Congress fails to amend them
identically.160
Projecting the logic of Gross onto the
circumstances in Villarreal suggests that the absence of the
“applicants for employment” from § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA
evidences a congressional intent not to amend the ADEA in line
with Title VII when it did so in 1972. As a result, this textual
inconsistency manifests a congressional intent to distinguish the
scope of disparate impact claims under the two statutes.
All that being said, the ruling in Gross has been widely
criticized for its cavalier approach to interpreting the override
amendment in the context of closely related statutes.161
Commentators have noted that the ruling presents a “turn-about
on the value of uniformity in employment discrimination law,”
reversing a canon of uniformity which has guided jurisprudence
in this arena.162 Similarly, employment discrimination expert,
Deborah Widiss, takes issue with the long-term implications of
Gross, writing, “[t]he rule of interpretation that the Court
announced in Gross is radically asymmetrical” with respect to
closely related statutes.163 These assessments outline the broad
problems that have emerged from the Gross decision. Overall,
the ruling ignores the overwhelming judicial, constitutional, and

159

See Gross, 577 U.S. at 174.
See id. Contra Villarreal II, 806 F.3d 1288, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“Congress has all kinds of reasons for passing laws, and presumably all kinds of
reasons for not passing laws as well. The 1972 change to Title VII was part of a
broad revamp of the statute aimed at expanding the jurisdiction and power of the
EEOC . . . . We will not assume that Congress chose not to pass legislation modifying
the ADEA simply because it did make this one change in a broader restructuring of
Title VII.”).
161
See, e.g., Meghan C. Cooper, Reading Between the Lines: The Supreme
Court's Textual Analysis of the ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 45
NEW. ENG. L. REV. 753, 765–66 (2011) (“This declaration [Gross] flies in the face of
decades of precedent and language by the Court to the contrary.”); Melissa Hart,
Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court's 2008–09 Labor and Employment Cases,
13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 253, 273–74 (2009) (“The substantive outcome in Gross
is not good for employment discrimination plaintiffs. The way the Court got there is
not good for the law.”); Katz, supra note 104, at 871 (“The Gross Court rejected a
perfectly reasonable and widely applied canon of construction—the presumption of
uniformity—with no good reason for doing so.”).
162
See Katz, supra note 104, at 857–58.
163
Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154 at 860–61.
160
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purposivist rationales that recommend courts analyze closely
related statutes according to a uniform scheme of interpretation,
in spite of textual disparities owing to intermittent amendments.
As an initial matter, the holding in Gross overlooks the
practical limitations of the statutory override.
Generally
speaking, a legislative override represents an attempt by
Congress to overrule, clarify, or curtail a ruling of the federal
courts.164
Most congressional overrides address individual
judicial decisions, not the overarching legal principles implicated
by a given opinion.165 For decades, Congress has relied on the
statutory override as a means of reversing specific rulings it
sought to invalidate or qualify.166
In other words, the
congressional override does not function as a remedial device for
correcting every potential interpretive ill introduced by the
Court.167 Rather, it is responsive to distinct judicial opinions,
which in themselves pertain to isolated statutory provisions.168
The history of legislative amendments to Title VII and the
ADEA confirms this finding.
Congress has amended the
employment discrimination statutes in reaction to Supreme
Court rulings on a statute-by-statute and case-by-case basis.169 It
has not amended one statute based on a ruling related to another
statute, albeit a closely related one. As just one ready example,
the ADEA has consistently been amended in response to
Supreme Court rulings on the ADEA, not rulings on Title VII, or
More
the ADA, or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.170
164
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991) (“A congressional
'override' includes a statute that: (1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory
interpretation decision . . . (2) modifies the result of a decision in some material
way . . . or (3) modifies the consequences of the decision. . . .”). Eskridge, a leading
scholar on statutory interpretation, repeats this definition elsewhere. Matthew R.
Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967—2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014).
165
See Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 164, at 1319–20.
166
See id.; Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 895 (emphasis in
original) (“In all of these overrides, Congress amended only the statute actually
interpreted in the prior judicial interpretation.”).
167
See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 930.
168
See id.
169
See id.; Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 164, at 1319–20.
170
See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (responding to United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192
(1977)); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-521, 104 Stat.
2287 (responding to Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S.
158 (1989)). See also Jessica Sturgeon, Smith v. City of Jackson: Setting an
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importantly, this record contradicts the inferential argument
outlined in Gross; the congressional override is a highly and
deliberatively narrow legislative transaction.
Without any
question, override amendments have never been mobilized to
redress the far-reaching consequences of the Court’s rulings
across a series of statutes.171
Yet, the holding in Gross now imposes on the legislative
branch the burden of formally amending similar statutes to avoid
the inference of congressional neglect.172 Under this scheme,
subcommittees must canvass the federal code and evaluate
whether or not to amend these closely related laws in tandem,
wholesale, piecemeal, or not at all.173
But again, this
requirement disregards the function of the override as a
narrowly-construed, corrective measure, and it ignores the
practical realities of the amendment enactment process.174
Otherwise, Congress would be performing a prophylactic
function, whereas the override process is necessarily
responsive.175 The burden is simply too immense for a Congress
preoccupied by a host of more urgent affairs.176 Requiring
Congress to implement trans-statutory amendments for a group
of closely related statutes would frustrate a prime interest in
efficiency contemplated by the override.177

Unreasonable Standard, 56 DUKE L.J. 1377, 1395 (2007) (“The 1991 amendments to
Title VII were not accompanied by corresponding changes to the ADEA. However,
Wards Cove was a Title VII decision, not a decision under the ADEA.”).
171
See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 930.
172
See Prenkert, supra note 119, at 255.
173
See id.
174
See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 923. Widiss uses the
terminology “blanket” amendment to describe this trans-statutory amendment
procedure.
175
See Eskridge, supra note 164, at 332 n.1.
176
See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 158, at 564–65.
177
See id. at 564; Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 861–62. (“This
approach improperly cabins the effects of congressional overrides and dramatically
aggrandizes the judicial role . . . . It distorts the separation of powers, making it
difficult for overrides to serve their intended role as a check on judicial law
making . . . .”). Moreover, there is the risk of congressional oversight implicated by
this procedure. It is conceivable that at least some of the statutes within a family of
statutes might escape congressional attention during these more comprehensive
amendment deliberations. See Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 890.
Under the ruling in Gross, the Court would infer from this inadvertent omission an
intent to ignore the given law, despite a purely unintended mistake. And while
seemingly administrable, the procedure of reverting back to historical
interpretations of Title VII presents various practical challenges. See E.E.O.C. v.
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At the same time, these reservations concerning
burdensome, trans-statutory amendment process invoke
constitutional matters of legislative supremacy. Arguably, the
holding in Gross disturbed the balance of power between
Congress and the judiciary with respect to overrides.178 The
Court in Gross inferred from the inconsistent amendment history
that Congress intended for the burdens of proof under Title VII
and the ADEA to diverge.179
However, the Gross ruling
overlooked evidence of Congress’s intent to apply the motivating
factor standard outlined in the CRA to the ADEA.180 Instead, the
Court assumed a more pronounced role, which contradicted
congressional will.181 The Gross opinion set forth a dangerous
precedent which authorized the Court to substitute its
interpretation for that of Congress, rejecting the deferential
stance of previous decades in the wake of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.182
For these discrete reasons, the Gross opinion proves
unpersuasive for interpreting § 4(a)(2) and the scope of disparate
impact under the ADEA. First, the Court in Gross disregarded
the interpretive scheme of uniformity which has guided and
informed adjudication of closely related statutes for decades. In
addition, the opinion incorrectly construed a statutory override
addressing just one ruling and installed it as a talisman of
legislative intent for other statutes. Again, the nature of the
congressional override as a direct, efficient response to an
isolated ruling does not function as a broad panacea that the

Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991). The Arabian American decision was
itself overridden by congressional amendment. For instance, plaintiffs often bring
claims under the ADEA and Title VII simultaneously, but now courts must apply
divergent standards of proof or causes of action. See Katz, supra note 104, at 865.
The disjunction of burdens under Gross overcomplicates pleading requirements
within the tightly-knit landscape of federal employment discrimination law. See id.
at 867; Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 860–61.
178
See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 158, at 560–61.
179
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009). The Court
rejected the causation standard under Price Waterhouse, expressing its disfavor for
direct evidence requirements in Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
180
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
697. The Committee Report for the 1991 CRA states that Congress “intends that
these other laws modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner
consistent with Title VII as amended by this Act.” Id.
181
See id.
182
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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Court presumed in Gross. Third, the trans-statutory amendment
process stipulated by the Court frustrates legislative purposes,
and invokes the possibility of a constitutional imbalance.
This robust critique of Gross suggests that job applicants
may assert disparate impact claims under the ADEA, despite the
textual disparity owing to the 1972 amendment of Title VII. And
the case study of Gross even leaves open the possibility that
Congress intended the 1972 amendment of Title VII to distribute
across the employment discrimination statutes, just as the
Committee Report for the 1991 CRA discloses a similar intent for
those amendments.
But perhaps most importantly, the canon of uniformity
overcomes the arguments predicated on the textual disparity
between the statutes. As discussed above, the congressional
override amending one statute reveals little of Congress’s intent
to either amend or fail to amend another statute. Given this, the
presumption persists that for closely related statutes which
share nearly identical language and serve a common purpose—
for example, combatting employment discrimination—jurists
should interpret these provisions uniformly. Therefore, § 4(a)(2)
of the ADEA supports disparate impact claims for job applicants.
IV. GRIGGS, THE HYDRA, AND THE STATUS OF DISPARATE IMPACT
CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA
Despite scholarly misgivings, Gross still stands as good law.
Therefore, its precepts on inconsistent amendments and
congressional neglect controls subsequent interpretation of the
ADEA. The procedure for interpreting override amendments
found in Gross should necessarily inform the interpretation of
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA. This is precisely why the absence of any
discussion of Gross in the Eleventh Circuit’s revised ruling is so
conspicuous.
The outcome in Gross reflects a phenomenon called the
“hydra problem” in statutory interpretation.183 The “hydra
problem” emerges when Congress overrides a judicial opinion
with respect to one statute, but does not amend closely related
statutes implicated by the decision.184 The congressional override
for the one law thus “sever[s] . . . a head”—or branch—of case law
183
184

Widiss, The Hydra Problem, supra note 154, at 863.
See id.
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which previously applied to the amended statute—that is the
1991 CRA with respect to Title VII and Price Waterhouse.185
However, because Congress invalidates these rulings with the
override, a “new [judicial] head” must evolve to interpret the
otherwise identical, though, unamended closely related law(s),
which Congress did not amend in a similar fashion.186 As a
result, “an entirely divorced parallel path of case law . . . that no
longer control[s] [the amended statute] . . . [is] deemed to control
the interpretation of [the] related statutes” which have not been
amended.187
This paradigm mirrors the holding in Gross. The Court
traced back the family tree of dormant Title VII case law to
identify the standard that controlled the ADEA prior to Price
Waterhouse and the 1991 CRA, namely, but-for causation.188
Thus, a new precedential “head”—or judicial branch—developed
to determine the proper standard of causation under the ADEA.
This had the effect of reviving otherwise moot rulings, which now
form the divergent branch of ADEA-employment-discrimination
case law. The causation standard under the ADEA is now
entirely disconnected from the current Title VII burdens, as well
as the Price Waterhouse opinion which the 1991 CRA overruled.
The ruling in Villarreal is itself symptomatic of the hydra
problem. The 1972 amendment to Title VII—adding “applicants
for employment” language—requires that a new, precedential
strain of case law emerge for the purposes of defining the scope of
disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Oddly enough, the
Eleventh Circuit declined any invitation to trace back the family
tree of Title VII, and revive pre-1972 case law.

185

Id.
Id. at 877–78.
187
Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 158, at 561; Sullivan, supra note 152,
at 157–58. Sullivan, summarizing Widiss, explains it in simplified terms:
This scenario arises when the Court construes Statute A in a way in which
Congress disapproves, and Congress responds by amending Statue A,
without formally amending analogous Statute B to like effect. When the
same interpretive question then arises under Statute B, the Court finds
that Congress's failure to amend Statute B conveys a legislative intent that
the two should be read differently. This is the “hydra problem”—Congress's
override of a judicial interpretation with which it disagreed (“the
metaphorical severing of a head”) justifies a different interpretation (“the
rapid growth of new head”) of other, unamended statutes.
Id.
188
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
186
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All that being said, the Gross paradigm generates an
interesting result when deployed in the context of disparate
impact claims under the ADEA, because jurists will arrive back
at Griggs v. Duke Power Co.189 The controversy in Griggs
centered on qualifying standards within an employee transfer
program.190 African American plaintiffs in Griggs alleged that
the required qualifications, such as a high school diploma and
various aptitude standards, functioned as barriers to their
advancement.191 The Court analogized the diploma and aptitude
thresholds to literacy tests administered to limit the black
franchise.192 Ultimately, it reached the conclusion that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under § 703(a)(2) of Title VII.193
As the watershed for disparate impact in employment
discrimination, Griggs lends ample support to the argument that
disparate impact claims are cognizable for job applicants under
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA. Even if the procedure in Gross is followed,
the language of Justice Burger’s opinion compels the finding that
disparate impact under the ADEA encompasses job applicants.
Justice Burger announced, “Congress has now required that the
posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account,”
recalling that Griggs pertained to an employee transfer
program.194
Justice Burger continued, “If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”195 Thus,
the Court in Griggs unequivocally held that disparate impact
claims extend to job applicants under Title VII, absent the 1972
Amendments to Title VII.196
In fact, the Court drew no
distinction between current and prospective employees, although
the plaintiffs in that case were current employees of Duke
Power.197

189

401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
Id. at 427–28.
191
Id. at 428–29.
192
Id. at 430.
193
See id. at 431.
194
Id. (emphasis added).
195
Id. (emphasis added) (“What is required by Congress is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.” (emphasis added)).
196
See id. at 436.
197
See id. at 429–30.
190
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In the end, Griggs proves dispositive for settling the present
dispute over disparate impact protections under the ADEA. The
Court delivered the Griggs ruling in 1971. However, Congress
only added the key phrase of “applicants for employment,” in
1972.198 This chronology is crucial. According to the ruling in
Gross, the decision in Griggs must govern the interpretation of
disparate impact claims under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, because
Griggs constitutes the relevant case law controlling Title VII
disparate impact protections prior to the 1972 amendment. Yet,
the Court in Griggs fully reached and resolved the question of
whether disparate impact protections encompass job applicants
in the affirmative: Job applicants enjoy these protections as
much as current employees do under Title VII.
So, despite even the best attempt to distinguish Title VII and
the ADEA in Gross, with its inference of intent from
congressional inaction, the interpretive framework of Gross
points back to Griggs, and the inescapable conclusion that job
seekers are entitled to disparate impact protections under the
ADEA. Thus, Gross itself compels the conclusion that disparate
impact claims lie for job applicants under both statutes, because,
regardless of the procedure required by Gross, the Court in
Griggs broadly outlined the scope of disparate impact in the
absence of the “applicants for employment” amendment. This,
itself, fully confirms the finding that job seekers enjoy disparate
impact protection under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, disparate impact claims
ought to be cognizable for job applicants under the ADEA. This
conclusion depends on the plain meaning of the statute, the
“canon of uniformity” for closely related statutes, the disposition
of case law surrounding the ADEA, practical considerations on
override amendments, and, finally, the outcome in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. Ironically—and that is the appropriate word—
the ruling in Gross only assists this position, rather than
198
See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8,
§ 703(a)(2), 86 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012)). In
ratifying the Act, the report attached to the bill declared, “The promises of equal job
opportunity made in 1964 must be made realities.” S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 8 (1971).
Once again, the legislative history explicitly references the job search process and
applicants.
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hindering it. And even if the preceding arguments prove wholly
unconvincing, this Note has not even addressed the official
EEOC interpretation of § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, which authorizes
job applicants to bring disparate impact claims, and which served
as the basis for the first Eleventh Circuit ruling in Villarreal,
which relied on Auer deference.199
Just recently, the North District of California held that job
applicants may assert disparate impact claims under the ADEA,
in contravention of the second Eleventh Circuit ruling in
Villarreal. There, in Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, the
plaintiffs brought a class action against the accounting firm,
alleging “ ‘systemic and pervasive discrimination against older
job applicants.’ ”200 The district court took full cognizance of the
arguments found in Villarreal, and yet arrived at the conclusion
that the disparate impact provision under the ADEA
encompasses job seekers.201 In fact, the court commented that
“Defendant’s
[PricewaterhouseCooopers]
statutory
comparison . . . cannot overcome the use of the phrase ‘any
individual’ ” in § 4(a)(2).202 On the topic of the 1972 amendment
to Title VII, Judge Tigar confirmed that the congressional action
after Griggs, in reality, bolsters the current position that
disparate impact claims lie for job seekers:
Defendant draws the wrong inference. As Plaintiffs [Rabin et
al.] point out, the amendment to Title VII was intended to be
“declaratory of the present law,” and “fully in accord with the
decision of the Court” in Griggs.
In other words, the
amendment signaled that Griggs had properly interpreted Title
VII as protecting both employees and applicants. Therefore, the

199
Under the standard in Auer, an agency is permitted to interpret ambiguous
terms found its own regulations, and such agency interpretations are entitled to
deference “unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). To be sure, the EEOC regulations of § 4(a)(2)
explain that “[a]ny employment practice that adversely affects individuals within
the protected age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory unless the
practice is justified by a ‘reasonable factor other than age.’ ” 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c).
See Villarreal II, 806 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2015).
200
Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1127 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
201
Id. at 1129.
202
Id.
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amendment supports, rather than detracts from, an
interpretation of the ADEA as likewise covering both employees
and applicants.203

Accordingly, the issue persists as to whether the ADEA enables
disparate impact protections for job applicants, and other jurists
have endorsed the precise arguments offered in this Note.
As a final comment, the purpose and tone of the ADEA
contemplates the challenges face by older Americans in securing
employment. A House committee report from 1967 confirms that
a chief purpose of the statute is to provide “a much-needed
vigorous, nationwide campaign to promote hiring without
discrimination on the basis of age.”204 The Wirtz Report, itself
the impetus for enacting the ADEA, contains similar mandates.
The following passage is most illustrative:
There is . . . no harsher verdict in most men’s lives than
someone else’s judgment that they are no longer worth their
keep. It is then, when the answer at the hiring gate is “You’re
too old,” that a man turns away, in [a] poet’s phrase, finding
“nothing to look backward to with pride, nothing forward to
with hope.”205

Evidently, it was the intent of the drafters for such protections to
reach all individuals for which the law is applicable.
Given these commentaries, the conclusion that the ADEA
allows for broad disparate impact claims is hardly a strained one.
Thus, the disparate impact provision of the ADEA, § 4(a)(2),
enables disparate impact claims for job applicants.

203
204

Id. at 1131.
H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 2214 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213,

2214.
205

Man).

Wirtz, supra note 7, at 1 (referencing Robert Frost’s The Death of the Hired

